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I Introduction 
Sections 171 to 177 of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”) codified the duties owed 
by directors to their companies in equity and at common law. Section 170(4) of the 
Act states that the codified duties: “shall be interpreted and applied in the same way 
as common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the 
corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying 
the general duties.”  
The principles and rules underpinning directors’ duties are generally fully addressed in 
the case law preceding the codification by the Act. The case law rules adopted by the 
Act’s codification are reasonably well developed in all areas of directors’ duties. A 
significant exception to this is the uncertainty surrounding the duty of directors to take 
account of the interests of creditors once a company becomes (or is close to 
becoming) insolvent. In giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in BTI 2014 LLC v 
Sequana SA and others [2019] EWCA Civ 112 (“Sequana”), David Richards LJ has 
provided very clear guidance on the operation of this duty and clarifies how and when 
the duty arises. 
Section 172 codifies what was formerly usually referred to as the fiduciary duty owed 
by a director to act bona fide in the best interests of the company. The statutory 
version of the duty states that a director must act in the way he or she considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members (shareholders) as a whole. In doing so, the director must have 
regard to a number of matters such as the long term effects of decisions, the interests 
of employees and the impact on the community and the environment. 
The duty to promote the success of the company is amended in circumstances where 
the company is insolvent or threatened by insolvency. In such circumstances, the duty 
owed by the director shifts from one owed to the company, taking into account what 
would be in the best interests of its members, to one owed to the company taking into 
account the interests of its creditors. Once a company is insolvent its members are no 
longer able to benefit from the company’s assets. The assets are instead held for the 
benefit of the company’s creditors. Section 172(3) states that the duty to promote the 
success of the company is subject to any rule of law which requires directors, in 
certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company. 
There has been a good deal of uncertainty as to when the duty to take into account 
the interests of creditors is triggered. This aspect of the duty is explained in Sequana. 
II Facts 
Dividends were paid when a company, AWA, had ceased to trade. AWA had one 
material outstanding contingent liability involving the uncertain clean-up costs arising 
out of a river pollution action in the USA. The majority of AWA’s assets consisted of an 
inter-company debt of €585 million owed to AWA by its parent company, Sequana. 
The dividends in question were authorised by AWA in favour of Sequana. A dividend, 
once authorised, becomes a debt enforceable at law. Instead of paying the dividends 
in cash, AWA set off the amount of the dividends against Sequana’s debt (effectively 
extinguishing the parent company’s liability to AWA). One of the purposes of the 
dividend payment was to prevent the money owed by Sequana being called in by AWA 
and used to cover the potentially enormous costs of its liability for river pollution. 
The case concerned an attack on the validity of the dividends paid by AWA to 
Sequana. The dividends, which had been legally authorised by AWA’s directors, were 
challenged on the basis: 1) that they were made with an intention to defraud creditors 
under section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986; and, in the alternative, 2) that they were 
paid in breach of duty by the directors of AWA to have regard to the interests of AWA’s 
creditors. In the High Court, the first ground succeeded but the second failed.  
III Decision 
The Court of Appeal upheld the first instance decision.  
Sequana is significant for its explanation of the directors’ duty to have regard to the 
interests of creditors but it also clarifies and recognises a new situation where section 
423 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is capable of operating. This note will not consider in 
any detail the section 423 point but will concentrate on the exposition of section 
172(3). 
a) Section 423  
The dividends were legally valid under Part 23 of the Companies Act 2006 (which 
deals specifically with the rules for the legality of a dividend) mainly due to how a 
company’s annual accounts deal with valuing and making allowances for contingent 
liabilities. The payment of the dividends was nevertheless found to fall foul of section 
423 of the Insolvency Act 1986. It was held to be a transaction at an undervalue where 
AWA had taken steps to put assets (the Sequana loan) beyond the reach of its 
creditors (present and future). AWA had received no consideration for the dividends, 
the payment fell within the broad definition of a transaction and AWA had paid the 
dividends with the purpose (which need not be the sole or dominant purpose) of 
putting monies beyond the reach of its creditors. The Court of Appeal upheld the first 
instance judgment that Sequana was liable to repay an amount up to the value of the 
dividend, that is, an order under section 423(2) which restored “the position to what it 
would have been if the transaction had not been entered into.” 
b) Creditors’ Interests Duty  
The appellants’ second argument was based upon the proposition that directors owe 
a duty to consider the interests of creditors in any case where a proposal involves a 
real, as opposed to a remote, risk to creditors. They claimed the duty had been 
triggered and breached on the facts of the case. 
In order to assess the nature and extent of a director’s duty owed to creditors, David 
Richards LJ, in a very clear and considered judgment1 explained the historical 
development of what was referred to as “the creditors’ interests duty”. His Lordship 
confirmed the comments of Rose J at first instance that:  
1) section 172(3) retains the common law principles as to when the duty arises;  
2) the duty is owed to the company not the creditors;  
3) there is a single threshold for when the duty arises for all decisions taken by 
directors;  
4) the content of the duty does not vary according to the degree of risk of insolvency; 
and  
5) a failure to have regard to the interests of creditors is not itself a breach of duty, if 
the directors could have reasonably concluded that the proposal should be approved 
even if creditors’ interests were taken into account. 
c) It comes from a Land Down Under 
His Lordship explained that the common law requirement to take into consideration 
the interests of creditors is of a fairly recent vintage. It first appeared in the Australian 
High Court in Walker v Wimborne2 where it was observed that a creditor’s interests 
must be taken into account where a company is insolvent. In the UK, obiter dicta a few 
years later by Templeman LJ in Re Horsely & Weight Ltd3 seem to extend this basic 
principle by suggesting that misfeasance or a “fraud on the creditors” may be 
perpetrated where a company expends money it could not afford in circumstances 
where the company is “doubtfully solvent”. 
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The only previous applicable Court of Appeal authority was that in West Mercia 
Safetywear Ltd v Dodd4 in which Dillon LJ held a director to be in breach of duty when, 
for his own purposes, he made a transfer of money “in disregard of the interests of the 
general creditors of this insolvent company”. West Mercia established two 
propositions: 1) the members of an insolvent company cannot ratify the acts of 
directors taken in disregard of the interests of creditors and so the directors of an 
insolvent company must have regard to those interests; and 2) where the company is 
insolvent, its assets are in a practical sense the assets of the creditors. 
In addition to the above, the Court in Sequana considered a number of subsequent 
Commonwealth authorities where it had been said in obiter dicta that the creditors’ 
interests duty arises “if the company is insolvent, or near-insolvent, or of doubtful 
solvency, or if a contemplated payment or other course of action would jeopardise its 
solvency” (per Cooke J in Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd5 a statement later approved 
by Street CJ in Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq)6). 
A number of English first instance decisions were also considered by the Court of 
Appeal. In particular, Facia Footwear Ltd v Hinchcliffe7 where it is suggested, again 
obiter, that the duty to take into account the interests of creditors arises where the 
company is “in a very dangerous financial position” or is in a “parlous financial state”. 
In Colin Gwyer & Associates Ltd v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd8 the duty was said to 
arise when the company “is insolvent or of doubtful solvency or on the verge of 
insolvency and it is the creditors’ money which is at risk”. To similar effect in Re MDA 
Investment Management Ltd,9 the duty was said to arise “when a company, whether 
technically insolvent or not, is in financial difficulties to the extent that its creditors are 
at risk”. 
In Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir10 the Supreme Court commented that the common law treated 
“the interests of an actually or prospectively insolvent company as synonymous with 
those of its creditors” and the duty to have regard to the creditors’ interests arises 
where the company is “insolvent or bordering on insolvency”.  
These UK authorities provide some support for the proposition that something short 
of actual, or established, insolvency will be sufficient to trigger the creditors’ interests 
duty but none of the English cases provides any support for a test which looks for “a 
real as opposed to a remote risk of insolvency”. 
d) Vegemite or Marmite? Like it not they are not the same thing 
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A number of other Australian cases adopted the test for the trigger of the creditors’ 
interests duty to be “a real, as opposed to a remote, risk of insolvency”.11  
Back in the UK, in Vivendi SA v Richards,12 Newey J cited with approval such Australian 
authority. Newey J regarded the test of a real as opposed to a remote risk to creditors 
as being “to similar effect” as the test of “insolvent or of doubtful solvency or on the 
verge of insolvency”. The same view was taken in Re HLC Environmental Projects Ltd13 
where the court did “not detect any difference in principle behind these varying verbal 
formulations”. 
David Richards LJ in Sequana did not view the tests as being the same thing 
expressed differently. They are different tests. A real, as opposed to a remote, risk of 
insolvency can arise even though the company is not insolvent and may very well 
never become insolvent. Although his Lordship did not expand upon this point it is 
clearly the case that many companies, often throughout their entire existence, operate 
where there is a real risk of insolvency. It is indeed the function of directors to take 
commercial risks in order to make a profit. A company facing a real risk of insolvency 
is not necessarily one where its demise is imminent or even likely. The test laid down 
in the Commonwealth cases therefore sets a less demanding test than one where the 
company is likely to become insolvent. It arguably encourages directors to be overly 
cautious. It perhaps makes more commercial sense for a director to be able to 
continue to take commercial risks where there is a real risk of insolvency but to stop 
doing so, and begin to act in the interests of creditors, once the company’s insolvency 
is likely (that is, more likely than not). 
e) Strewth – not True Blue Aussie! 
As well as considering the UK and Commonwealth case law, David Richards LJ 
considered in detail the UK legislative and law reform history of section 172 as well as 
other legislative provisions considering the meaning of solvency.  
His Lordship concluded that there were at least four possible answers to the question 
of when the creditors’ interests duty is triggered:  
1) it may be only when the company is actually insolvent, either on a cash-flow or 
balance sheet basis; 
2) it may arise when the company is on the verge of insolvency or nearing or 
approaching insolvency;  
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3) it may arise when the company is likely to become insolvent (which his Lordship 
interpreted as what judges mean when they refer to a company as being of dubious 
solvency); or  
4) it might, consistently with the Australian and other Commonwealth authorities, be 
where there is a real, as opposed to a remote, risk of insolvency.  
Such phrases as the company being in a parlous financial state or in financial 
difficulties, could fall within either category 2) or 3). Although such words of 
description may accurately reflect the situation in any given case they were too vague 
to form a useful test for the trigger moment for engaging the creditors’ interests duty. 
His Lordship was very clear to point out that the tests in category 2), 3) and 4) were 
different and not merely alternative ways of saying the same thing. A real as opposed 
to a remote risk of insolvency is a significantly lower threshold than being either on the 
verge of insolvency or likely to become insolvent. Category 4), based upon 
Commonwealth authorities, did not form part of the present UK law as regards the 
creditors’ interests duty. It was not appropriate (considering both policy 
considerations and other provisions of the Companies Act) for the courts to introduce 
such a test as a development of the common law.  
The Court concluded that actual insolvency (category 1 above) was enough for the 
duty to be triggered but was not the only threshold for the duty to be engaged. 
Directors may not know, nor be expected to know, that a company is in fact insolvent 
until sometime later. A test falling short of established insolvency is therefore justified. 
The problem identified with category 2) was that it used phrases such as being “on the 
verge of insolvency”, which suggests a temporal test. If the test is that insolvency is 
“imminent”, or if similar words are used, it suggests that actual insolvency will be 
established within a very short time. It does not cover the situation where, although 
the company may be able to pay its debts as they fall due for some time, insolvency is 
nonetheless likely to occur with the result that decisions taken by directors now may 
prejudice creditors.  
His Lordship therefore discounted category 2) and adopted category 3). The test for 
when the duty is triggered is therefore when the directors know or should know that 
the company is or is likely to become insolvent. In this context, “likely” means 
probable. 
On the facts of the case, there was nothing to suggest that at the time of the dividends 
being authorised that AWA was insolvent or was likely to become insolvent. The 
trigger for the duty had not occurred. 
IV Fair Dinkum 
Although the creditors’ interests duty originated in Australia, the UK case law has 
moved away from the widely defined Antipodean trigger moment for its operation. 
The reasoning in Sequana is extremely clear and persuasive. It may be that other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions will consider following its reasoning in preference to their 
own courts’ decisions. Only time will tell, but what Sequana does is to bring some 
clarity to a question which has until now been opaque. 
Although not mentioned in the judgment, the test adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
Sequana echoes and is consistent with the wording of the wrongful trading provisions 
found in the Insolvency Act 1986.14 There is much to be said in favour of the 
consistency of terminology brought in by Sequana. Where a company’s directors know 
or ought to know a company is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent, those 
directors are under a duty under section 172(3) of the Act, and the wrongful trading 
provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, to act in the best interests of the company’s 
creditors. This will normally involve them acting in a way to minimise potential loss to 
those creditors (adopting the wording of the defence found in the wrongful trading 
provisions). Sequana very helpfully brings together the statutory provisions dealing 
with the situation where directors must stop acting in the interests of a company’s 
members and instead begin to act in the best interests of creditors. Consistency and 
clarity have helpfully been introduced.15 
It should be remembered that the codified duties of a director are owed to the 
company. Following Sequana, it is now clear that once a company’s directors know or 
ought to know that the company is insolvent or is likely to become insolvent16 the 
directors thereafter are under a duty to the company to have regard to the interests of 
creditors. A breach of that duty will entitle the company to recover compensation for 
the loss caused to the company (which will include the loss indirectly caused to 
present and future creditors). The duty of the directors to have regard to the interests 
of creditors, in such circumstances, is not a duty directly enforceable by creditors 
against directors. 
One point not fully addressed in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, as it did not arise 
as an issue, is the extent to which directors must take into account the creditors’ 
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interests once the duty is triggered. The two options are whether: 1) the interests of 
creditors are to be considered as paramount; or 2) their interests are to be considered, 
along with other factors such as those listed in section 172(1), without being decisive. 
Although making only an obiter statement, David Richards LJ states fairly 
categorically that “where the directors know or ought to know that the company is 
presently and actually insolvent, it is hard to see that creditors’ interests could be 
anything but paramount.” 
